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ABSTRACT 
This chapter investigates the effectiveness and the motivation behind the choice of different 
types of distress resolution strategies in the banking sector. This is a global study that 
analyzes key financial characteristics of distressed banks that were either acquired by other 
banks, divested assets, or were subject to government intervention, as well as the change in 
the financial profile of those distressed institutions from one year pre-deal to three years 
post-deal. The results show that governments intervene in the (relatively) best performers 
that only underperform in liquidity ratios, an indication of critical short-term flow problems. 
Distressed sellers, the underperformers of the three groups, enjoy much improved 
performance, in particular in cross-border deals. There is some evidence of foreign acquirers 
‘cherry picking’ the least distressed banks, though no significant differences in target 
performance remain post-deal between cross-border and domestic deals. These findings 
provide some useful guidance for policy makers globally and for future financial crises that 
impact the banking sector. 
Key words: Banking sector; Distressed acquisitions; Distressed divestitures; Government 
intervention. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 – 2009 global financial crisis has had a major impact in the banking sector leading 
to the need to identify the most effective strategies that can be adopted by banks and 
government agencies to resolve corporate distress in the industry. Worldwide, governments 
have been forced to step in and orchestrate massive bailouts in order to prevent the financial 
world from collapsing (e.g., Northern Rock, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac) as shown in the 
timeline of events illustrated in Figure 1. 
 October 3 2008 
The Troubled 
Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) 
is formally 
established, 
giving the US 
Treasury $700 
billion to purchase 
sub-prime loans 
from banks. 
Figure 1: 2007 - 2009 Global Financial Crisis – Chronology of Events and Bank Rescues
April 3 2007 
New Century 
Financial, the 
largest sub-
prime lender in 
the US, files for 
Chapter 11 
bankruptcy 
protection. 
July 31 2007 
Two of Bear 
Stearns’ hedge 
funds, 
specializing in 
sub-prime, file 
for bankruptcy. 
August 2007 
Central banks 
around the world 
inject $300 
billion into the 
credit markets to 
ease the liquidity 
freeze. 
February 17 2008 
The UK 
government 
announces the 
nationalization of 
Northern Rock. 
March 16 2008 
JP Morgan 
acquires Bear 
Stearns in a deal 
brokered by the 
Federal Reserve. 
June 25 2008 
Bank of 
America 
acquires 
Countrywide 
Bank. 
September 7 2008 
The US government 
takes control of 
Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
March 2 2009 
AIG declares 
the largest 
quarterly loss 
in US history, 
$60 billion. 
December 18 2009 
The FDIC closes 
another seven US 
banks, bringing the 
total for the year to 
140. 
September 14 2008 
Bank of America 
announces intention 
to buy Merrill 
Lynch. 
September 15 2008 
Lehman Brothers 
collapses. 
September 16 2008 
The US government 
agrees to lend AIG 
$85 billion in 
emergency funds. 
September 17 2008 
Lloyds TSB 
announces the 
acquisition of 
HBOS for £12 
billion. 
September 26 2008 
US regulators seize 
control over Mutual 
Washington’s assets 
with parts being sold 
to JP Morgan. 
September 29 2008 
The Icelandic 
government takes 
control of Glitnir. In 
Britain, the 
mortgage lender 
Bradford and 
Bingley is 
nationalized. 
October 4 2008 
Wells Fargo 
acquires 
Wachovia for $15 
billion. 
October 17 2008 
The EU signs off 
a $2.7 trillion 
bank bailout. 
March 9 2009 
The Icelandic 
government 
nationalizes the 
last major 
Icelandic bank. 
March 30 2009 
The Bank of 
Spain takes 
control over 
Caja Castilla 
La Mancha, the 
first Spanish 
bailout. 
Note: ‘Events’ are described in gray boxes and ‘Bank Rescues’ in 
white boxes. 
This schedule references ‘Welcome to the Museum of Natural 
Credit Crunch’, April 2009, Financial Times, and ‘Timeline: 
Credit Crunch to Downturn’, August 2009, BBC News Online. 
  
In just the US, it has been estimated that the asset relief program, which was implemented to 
prevent a collapse of the entire banking system in 2008, amounted to $700 billion (Guerrera 
and Guha, 2010). In the context of the high costs associated with government bailout 
programs and the need to recover the funds provided to financial institutions by the 
government, many academics and practitioners have questioned the effectiveness of 
government intervention as a distress resolution strategy. Consequently, the ability to identify 
viable alternatives to government intervention in the banking sector such as acquisitions (e.g., 
Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia) and divestitures (e.g., Barclays’ announced sale of 
iShares and Banco Popolare’s divestiture of 33 branches to Credit Emiliano), including cross-
border deals (e.g., Banco Santander’s acquisition of Sovereign Bancorp), is an issue of 
particular interest and importance for academics and practitioners alike. In fact, Tschoegl 
(2004) argues that “foreign banks can act as rehabilitators of weak or failed banks” with their 
most obvious role being that of recapitalizing and restructuring the distressed banks. 
However, they are more likely to take over banks in relatively better shape. Note as well that 
this phenomenon is not new, as healthy banks have been involved in the purchase of weak or 
failing banks for many decades, often with the support or encouragement of governments. 
Deutsche Bank’s cross-border acquisition of Bankers Trust in 1999 is just one such example. 
This chapter will, however, focus on the implications of these deals in today’s market, 
although building on a database of such deals going back to 1994, and utilize a global 
database covering targets from 20 different countries. Approximately 60% of the deals are 
cross-border (excluding government deals). 
There are different restructuring methods that a financial institution at risk of default can 
use for the purpose of resolving distress: i) the distressed bank may be acquired by another 
bank and thereby rescued through an injection of fresh capital; ii) the distressed bank may be 
the acquirer in a merger and acquisition (M&A) deal as a survival strategy via the acquisition 
of assets or even an entire financial institution; this deal type can be structured as a merger of 
equals or a reverse takeover, where the payment structure is such that the target transforms 
into the acquirer; iii) the distressed bank may divest assets in order to increase cash levels and 
improve capital adequacy; often, the assets that are divested are profitable and represent the 
‘crown jewels’ of the business of the distressed seller; iv) survival M&A deals may be 
orchestrated by the government when banks that are of great significance to a national 
banking system (due to reputation, size, or interbank connections) are at risk of default; in 
these cases it is not unusual for the government to step in and ‘encourage’ a deal; and v) the 
government may act as the lender of last resort, rescuing the bank by using taxpayers’ money 
 or nationalizing the bank. The first three of these methods are most often structured as 
domestic deals, but can also be cross-border. 
So far, there has been no methodical and comprehensive analysis of the different 
restructuring types that can be employed as distress resolution methods in the banking sector 
and the way these deals may be a function of or impact on the financial characteristics of 
banks involved in such deals, as noted by Elsas (2007). Studies of deals involving distressed 
banks are very few and limited in scope, focusing on the probability of bank failure through 
liquidation or acquisition by another bank (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000), or the comparison 
of M&A deals involving distressed and non-distressed banks (Elsas, 2007; Koetter et al, 
2007). In what concerns cross-border deals, only the following three papers focus on the 
target banks, and their findings are somehow mixed: while there is generally some consensus 
that target banks are poor performers prior to the acquisition, the first study finds increases in 
profit efficiency but not in cost efficiency or profitability (Vander and Vennet, 2002), another 
shows no performance improvements (Correa, 2008), and the most recent study finds 
subsequent improvements in profitability and efficiency (Fraser, 2009). The aim of this 
chapter is thus to bring these different research papers together by analyzing distressed banks 
involved in M&A deals whether through acquisitions, divestitures, or government 
intervention. 
The ability to resolve distress in banks in an efficient manner is of crucial importance to 
the sound functioning of national and global financial systems. In fact, the financial system of 
any particular country plays a pivotal role owing to three key characteristics of banks and the 
banking system which render them different from the rest of the economy. Firstly, banks 
transfer financial capital from economic agents with surplus funds to those with a deficit. 
Secondly, the sound functioning of any banking system is founded on the basis of confidence 
in the financial stability of the banking institutions themselves. Thirdly, due to the nature of 
the banking system, the bankruptcy of one bank may trigger contagion effects within the 
financial sector and result in the collapse of the entire system. These three characteristics of 
the financial system imply that the inability to resolve effectively distress in the sector could 
lead to severe loss of welfare for society and significant value erosion for the economy as a 
whole.  
In order to analyze the different methods of eliminating distress that have been adopted 
by financial institutions at risk of default, this chapter examines a unique dataset of 59 
representative deals that involved distressed banks over the period 1994 – 2005. Since 
information about banks that are at risk of default is most often confidential, this study uses 
 the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (based on a three-year industry moving 
average) in order to identify the banks that were distressed within the examined sample (see 
Carapeto et al., 2010). In addition, it is assumed that those banks which were the subject of 
government intervention (i.e., majority acquisition) were distressed. Following Tschoegl’s 
(2004) observation of the rehabilitation role that foreign banks can play as acquirers of 
distressed banks, the analysis considers a cross-section of domestic and cross-border deals. 
Specifically, the sample comprises 14 cases of government intervention, 18 divestitures of 
major assets (including six cross-border deals), and 20 cases where the distressed bank was 
acquired (including 14 cross-border acquisitions); note that there were no cases of distressed 
banks acquiring other banks, although in theory this option would exist as mentioned above. 
It should be noted as well that, in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different types of restructuring deals as distress resolution techniques, it is necessary to take 
into account all the different costs that are foregone by avoiding the bankruptcy of financial 
institutions. This type of analysis requires, however, the ability to measure the foregone 
social costs associated with the bankruptcy of financial institutions, as well as the indirect 
financial and economic costs that could result from the contagion effects associated with the 
bankruptcy of banks. Since it is very difficult to capture these types of foregone costs 
associated with bank bankruptcy, this study instead considers the perspective of the investors 
in financial institutions when analyzing the effectiveness of different distress resolution 
techniques, and therefore their interest in the financial performance of the banks in which 
they own shares as that financial performance will have a direct impact on shareholder value. 
As a result, the analysis performed in this chapter is focused entirely on the financial profile 
of banks and how this financial profile is impacted by the different distress resolution 
methods. Although this study analyzes a period of one year prior to three years post-deal, 
results of distress resolution strategies may require longer to take full effect, yet it is clear that 
the first three years post-deal will certainly provide a strong indication of the likely direction 
of that long-term performance 
Using financial ratios one year prior to the deals, the results show that distressed banks 
with government intervention are the best performers to start with. This finding is true for all 
of the financial performance factors except for the issue of liquidity, where these deals 
underperform the other methods of intervention. This result is because critical short-term 
liquidity problems constitute the main reason for the government intervention. Strategies 
involving the sale of divisions in distressed banks especially to foreign banks are associated 
with much improved performance post-deal, in particular because, prior to the deal, 
distressed sellers are the underperformers of the three groups. Distressed targets are 
 somewhere in the middle when it comes to performance, with some evidence of ‘cherry 
picking’ by foreign acquirers of the least distressed banks. Three years later no differences 
persist in performance between targets of cross-border and domestic acquisitions, as the 
distressed targets involved in domestic deals catch up with those acquired in cross-border 
transactions. 
As the study uses three-year performance post-deal to determine success, it has not been 
possible to include the more recent distressed banking deals, e.g., Bank of America’s 
acquisition in late 2008 of Merrill Lynch or Lloyds TSB’s purchase of HBOS in the same 
period. Nevertheless, the analysis of a recent global sample of distressed banks over 2007 – 
2009 reveals that the motivation behind their choice of resolution strategies in terms of one-
year performance prior to deal announcement is consistent for most factors with the results 
outlined here for deals from the earlier years. As such, the findings of this research may 
therefore be extended to the recent financial crisis. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature on distressed and non-distressed M&A deals within the financial services sector as 
well as the role and consequences of government intervention in the sector. Section 3 
describes the sample and methodology used in the study. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on mergers and acquisitions within the financial services sector is vast 
and the majority of empirical studies are based on US data. The results on post-M&A 
performance are typically quite mixed. Findings range from improvements in cost efficiency 
(Becalli and Frantz, 2009) and profitability (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992) to no 
improvements in operating efficiency (Chamberlain, 1998), profit efficiency, or profitability 
(Linder and Crane, 1992; Beccalli and Frantz, 2009). On the international side, Correa (2008) 
finds that, compared to domestic deals, target banks involved in cross-border deals are 
typically larger, poor performers, and fail to enjoy improvements in performance post-deal, 
with routine decreases in net interest margin to gain market share in developed markets or 
increased overhead costs in emerging markets. Fraser and Zhang (2009) corroborate the poor 
operating performance of targets involved in cross-border acquisitions in the years leading up 
to the deals, but finds subsequent improvements in profitability and efficiency. However, 
Vander and Vennet (2002) show that target banks enjoy increases in profit efficiency but not 
 in cost efficiency or profitability in cross-border deals. Beccalli and Frantz (2009) find 
improvements in cost efficiency but a slight deterioration in profitability and profit efficiency 
for the combined entity following cross-border deals. 
Since the objective of this chapter is to analyze the choice of deal as a distress resolution 
technique, this literature review is focused on those studies that examine the performance 
characteristics of targets and acquirers before and after the completion of distressed M&A 
deals. The review starts with the key studies on distressed deals and is followed by those 
studies that analyze the effects of government intervention within the financial services 
sector. 
 
Distressed Deals 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) relate the probability of bank failure (including acquisition by 
another bank) in the USA to various bank characteristics, with a special emphasis on 
managerial quality as reflected in alternative measures of productive efficiency. The sample 
of banks included in the study comprises 231 failed banks and 2,380 banks that were acquired 
over a period from1984 to1993. The results of the study suggest that small banks with low 
leverage and high asset quality, profitability, liquidity, and efficiency are more likely to be 
acquired.  
Elsas (2007) examines the consequences of the use of M&A deals to resolve financial 
distress of 266 distressed banks from a total of 2,480 banks in Germany over the period 1993 
– 2001. The results of the study show that if a bank is distressed, then there is an increased 
probability that it will participate in an M&A deal. In addition, the asset quality of the 
combined entity increases substantially for several years after a distressed deal. The findings 
also indicate that there is a temporary decrease in profitability and no significant change in 
the degree of default risk or cost efficiency. Altogether, there is evidence of diversification 
gains for the combined entity relative to non-distressed M&A deals.  
Koetter et al. (2007) use undisclosed information to compare the characteristics of 
acquirers and targets that participated in about 1,000 M&A deals in Germany over the period 
1995 – 2001, including 141 distressed targets. According to the results of the study, 
distressed participants in M&A deals have in general bad financial profiles, defined by lower 
capital reserve ratios, lower exposure to securities business, higher net loan loss provisions, 
and below average efficiency, relative to banks that do not participate in M&A deals.  
  
Government Intervention 
Since the financial sector is prone to periods of instability and is also highly regulated, it is 
important to analyze the role of the regulatory environment and regulatory intervention when 
examining financial institutions. The major role of regulators and, more specifically, 
government agencies as the principal actors in the regulatory framework is to monitor the 
financial soundness of banks and the financial stability of the entire banking system. This role 
is particularly important when a bank is at risk of default. In the majority of cases, 
government bodies have to step in and act as intermediaries in order to prevent individual 
bank failures and systemic banking crises. According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), there 
are three methods that government agencies can adopt in order to prevent firm-specific and 
systemic failures: i) the government can encourage a healthy bank to acquire the distressed 
one; ii) the distressed bank can be recapitalized via the injection of fresh capital by the 
government; and iii) the government can establish an asset management company in order to 
buy all the non-performing bank assets (the so-called ‘bad bank’ solution). The review of the 
literature on government intervention within the financial services sector shows that there is 
little agreement on what constitutes best practice or even good practice when considering the 
possible policies to prevent the bankruptcy of financial institutions and avoid or resolve 
systemic financial crises.  
Laeven and Valencia (2008) compare the above-mentioned methods of government 
intervention in order to determine which type of policy works most effectively under 
different economic circumstances. According to the results of the study, the fiscal costs and 
output losses associated with policies to resolve systemic financial crises can be considerable. 
The study also indicates that emergency liquidity support and the provision of government 
guarantees have been the most frequently used policy tools for managing financial crises by 
governments in the past. Bank recapitalization programs can be successful if they are 
selective with regard to the institutions which they entitle to assistance, if they specify 
quantifiable rules that determine access to preferred stock assistance and if they implement 
capital regulation requirements which establish meaningful standards for risk-based capital. 
The formation of government-owned asset management firms appears least effective in terms 
of resolving distress, owing to legal and political constraints. In order to resolve the financial 
distress of companies and households, intervention via the implementation of targeted debt 
relief programs to distressed borrowers and corporate restructuring programs appear most 
successful.  
 The issue of the effectiveness of government intervention in resolving distress is of 
particular importance in the context of the US government rescue plan developed in 2009 in 
order to acquire the non-performing assets of a large number of distressed financial 
institutions. The so-called ‘Geithner-Summers Plan’ involved a public-private investment 
program (PPIP) that was set up to absorb the impaired assets of distressed banks which was 
intended to enable those distressed institutions to resume lending. This government rescue 
strategy has certainly been criticized by many academics and economists for creating an 
overbid of assets at the expense of taxpayers. Wilson (2009) argues that shareholders of 
banks that face insolvency will sell impaired assets at a price equal to their expected future 
value plus the value of the put option that shareholders hold, owing to their limited liability. 
Consequently, according to that author, the government is not able to acquire the non-
performing assets of distressed banks without simultaneously providing the banks that 
voluntarily participate in the asset sell-off with substantial taxpayers’ subsidy. 
In addition, Sachs (2009) argues that the rescue plan devised by the US Treasury is 
inefficient due to the fact that the PPIPs will be purchasing the non-performing assets of 
distressed banks at a premium. Using an analysis of the capital structure of the purchase deal, 
the author shows how the price that will be paid in order to acquire the impaired assets 
includes a subsidy to the shareholders of the distressed bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation finances 85.7% of the asset purchase via a non-recourse loan and the US 
Treasury and private investors each commit 7.15% respectively. As a result of this capital 
structure of the deal, it is expected that private investors will be willing to offer a higher price 
than the expected future value of the non-performing assets which should equal the maximum 
price under which they can still break even.  
Ayotte and Skeel (2009) analyze the effectiveness of government bailouts as a method to 
resolve bank distress and avoid systemic banking crises. The authors suggest that government 
rescue loans could increase uncertainty and the costs of moral hazard, and dampen the 
incentive of financial institutions to attempt and prevent or resolve distress without the 
provision of government aid. Consequently, the study concludes that government rescue 
schemes are likely to create costs over and above the direct costs to the taxpayer of the rescue 
funding. While there are considerable costs associated with resolving distress via filing for 
bankruptcy using Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the authors argue that 
the firm-specific costs related to bankruptcy tend to be overstated and may not be sufficient 
to justify government intervention.  
 In summary, the review of the literature on distressed M&A within the banking sector 
shows that there is no systematic and comprehensive analysis of the motivation behind the 
use of the different distressed M&A deal structures that banks participate in and their post-
merger performance. More specifically, no studies compare the motivation behind using 
government intervention, outright M&A, or divestitures as strategies to resolve financial 
distress. In addition, there are no empirical studies that examine the effectiveness of the 
different strategies to deal with financial distress in terms of the changes in the key financial 
characteristics of the financial institutions that adopt and/or become the subject of these 
distress resolution techniques. Consequently, the primary objective of this chapter is to 
eliminate this existing deficiency within the literature on M&A deals within the banking 
sector.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study analyzes the characteristics of distressed banks with respect to their size, asset 
quality, capital adequacy, efficiency, profitability, and liquidity one year prior to the 
announcement of restructuring deals, and how these characteristics change afterwards. Table 
1 presents the specific accounting ratios that have been used to proxy for these financial 
characteristics.  
  
 Table 1: Definitions of Financial Ratios 
TYPE RATIO DEFINITION 
Size Total Assets The value of a bank’s total assets is used as a proxy for 
size. 
Asset Quality 
Loan Loss 
Provision to Net 
Interest Revenue 
This ratio represents the relationship between provisions 
of expected future losses in a bank's income statement 
and the interest income generated over the same period. 
In a well run bank, if the lending policy is higher risk, 
then the approach should be compensated by higher 
interest margins. Therefore, this ratio should be as low 
as possible. 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Total Equity to 
Total Assets 
This ratio represents bank equity capital functions as a 
cushion against unexpected losses in asset value. 
Consequently, this ratio measures the degree to which a 
bank is protected against a sudden fall in asset value and 
the higher the ratio, the less vulnerable a bank is. 
Efficiency Cost to Income Ratio 
This ratio equals total overhead costs of a bank divided 
by the income generated before accounting for any 
provisions. The lower the ratio, the more efficient a bank 
is. 
Profitability  
Return on 
Average Assets 
This ratio equals the net income generated by the bank 
before any interest and dividend payments divided by 
the average of the total assets of the bank of the year 
before and the year in which the income was earned. 
This ratio is used to compare the efficiency and 
operational performance between different banks. The 
higher the ratio the better. 
Net Interest 
Margin 
This ratio equals the net interest income a bank 
generates as a percentage of its operating assets. A 
higher ratio indicates that a bank is charging a high 
interest margin or that it can acquire cheap funding. 
Higher profitability and interest margins are desirable as 
long as they do not result in a deterioration of the quality 
of bank assets. 
Liquidity 
Interbank Ratio 
This ratio is equal to the funds lent to other banks 
divided by the funds borrowed from other banks. A ratio 
higher than 100% indicates that a bank is a net lender 
and vice versa. A higher ratio indicates a better liquidity 
position. 
Net Loans to 
Total Assets 
This ratio equals net loans divided by total assets and 
indicates what proportion of a bank's assets are tied up 
in loans. A lower ratio indicates a better liquidity 
position. 
 
  
 In order to perform the above-mentioned type of analysis, it is necessary to have a reliable, 
accurate, and simple measure of distress to be able to distinguish between the distressed and 
non-distressed deals. Following Carapeto et al. (2010), this study uses the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans based on a three-year industry moving average to distinguish 
between distressed and healthy financial institutions. In addition, those banks in the sample 
which are targets of government agencies are assumed to be distressed since the only feasible 
motivation behind government agencies acquiring banks is to resolve distress. This study 
investigates the direct financial effects of different distress resolution techniques and, as a 
result, takes the perspective of the investors of the financial institutions that participate in 
distressed deals. This approach is adopted due to the fact that the indirect costs that are 
foregone by avoiding the bankruptcy of financial institutions (e.g., social costs and the 
economic and financial costs that could result from the contagion effects of the failure of 
banks) are difficult to capture with the use of financial ratios or other company-specific data. 
As noted above, this study analyzes performance over a period of one year before to three 
years after the announcement of the deals, despite the recognition of the fact that the results 
of the implemented strategies to resolve distress may require much longer to materialize.  
This study uses data on mergers, acquisitions, and divestiture deals in the banking sector 
acquired from the Bloomberg database. The sample is global and comprises all 1,930 
announced and completed banking deals over the period 1987 – 2005, including 1,216 
acquisitions, 695 divestitures, and 19 government interventions (majority purchases). As 
three-year performance is then analyzed for each deal, the sample period extends to 2008. 
The search criteria for relevant deals did not include any specific constraints, apart from 
limiting the observations of targets and sellers to public companies within the banking 
industry and the need to analyze the performance of the distressed banks one year prior to the 
deal and three years afterwards. In this initial sample, there are 25 distressed targets and 28 
distressed sellers using the definition of distress from Carapeto et al. (2010). Issues of data 
availability restrict the final sample to 59 deals (down from 72, hence still quite 
representative) which comprises 14 cases of government intervention, 25 divestitures, and 20 
acquisitions, within the period from 1994 to 2005. Of these, almost half (27) are cross-border 
deals (14 acquisitions and 13 divestitures). Table 2 shows the time-series distribution of the 
sample of distressed banks as well as type of deals and country of target in the final sample. 
  
 Table 2: Sample Description 
Panel A: Time-series distribution 
Year Acquisition Divestiture Government Total 
1994   1 1 
1996   1 1 
1997  1  1 
1998  1 2 3 
1999 4 1  5 
2000 5 5 4 14 
2001 3 1 3 7 
2002 1 3 1 5 
2003 3 7 1 11 
2004 4 1  5 
2005  5 1 6 
Total 20 25 14 59 
 
Panel B: Cross-border/domestic distribution 
Restructuring Type Cross-Border Domestic Total 
Acquisition 14 6 20 
Divestiture 13 12 25 
Government   14 
Total 27 18 59 
 
Panel C: Country distribution 
Country Acquisition Divestiture Government Total 
Canada 
 
1 
 
1 
China 1 
 
1 2 
Croatia 3 
  
3 
Denmark 
  
1 1 
Germany 
 
2 1 3 
India 
  
1 1 
Indonesia 1 
 
1 2 
Israel 
 
1 
 
1 
Italy 7 8 2 17 
Japan 1 1 1 3 
Lithuania 
  
1 1 
Malaysia 
 
1 
 
1 
Norway 
  
1 1 
Philippines 1 3 
 
4 
Poland 6 3 2 11 
Portugal 
 
1 
 
1 
Romania 
  
1 1 
United Kingdom 
 
1 
 
1 
United States 
 
3 
 
3 
Venezuela 
  
1 1 
Total 20 25 14 59 
 
  
 Financial ratios are collected for each bank over a period of one year prior to three years after 
the announcement of the deal from the Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. Information 
from the BankScope database has also been used to estimate industry medians. In order to 
ensure consistency when calculating the industry medians, certain categories of banks 
(‘clearing institutions’ and ‘other non-banking credit institutions’) were excluded from the 
dataset due to the fact that these groupings were not represented in the sample of deals that is 
examined in this study. Each accounting ratio is adjusted for industry effects by subtracting 
the industry median for the corresponding year. This procedure ensures that financial 
institutions are analyzed relative to their peers and thereby strengthens the validity of the 
findings of the study, consistent with e.g., Fraser and Zhang (2009). The analysis of the 
characteristics of participants in distressed M&A deals involves tests of equality of medians 
between different groups of targets and sellers, and the performance analysis comprises tests 
of the changes in the accounting measures examined in this study from the aforementioned 
one year prior to the deal to three years post-deal outcomes. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Motivation behind the Choice of Distress Resolution Methods 
Table 3 shows the analysis of the different financial characteristics of distressed targets and 
sellers one year prior to the announcement of M&A, divestiture, or government intervention, 
in order to identify motivational differences with regard to the resolution strategy that the 
distressed banks adopt and/or to which they become subject. 
 
 Table 3: Bank Performance Pre-Restructuring 
Ratios Acquisitions Testa Divestitures Testb Government Testc Total 
Size 20   25   14   59  
Median 8,358.25  *** 41,036.10  ** 10,336.40   18,884.50  
Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue 20   25   12   57  
Median 27.49   35.58  *** 11.82   27.38  
Industry-Median Adjusted 26.14 ***  34.17 *** *** 10.21 **  26.03 *** 
Total Equity to Total Assets 20   25   13   58  
Median 7.51  * 5.48  *** 16.61  *** 7.31  
Industry-Median Adjusted -1.00  * -2.91 ** *** 15.74 *** *** -0.62  
Cost to Income Ratio 20   25   14   59  
Median 65.67   70.72  *** 1.48  *** 64.28  
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.28   5.18  ** 0.84   0.87  
Return on Average Assets 20   25   14   59  
Median 0.35   0.21  *** 8.10  *** 0.57  
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.34 **  -0.61 *** *** 7.41 *** *** -0.20 * 
Net Interest Margin 20   25   14   59  
Median 3.37  ** 2.33   3.15   3.03  
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.27  ** -1.30 *** *** 1.91 ** ** -0.35  
Interbank Ratio 15   20   14   49  
Median 69.80   70.34  *** 44.61  *** 58.61  
Industry-Median Adjusted -7.18  * -19.84 ***  37.09   -14.95  
Net Loans to Total Assets 20   24   14   58  
Median 56.26   59.10   53.64   57.34  
Industry-Median Adjusted -4.08 ***  -0.07  *** 46.49 * *** -0.85  
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, and refer to the sign test on the significance of Industry Median-adjusted indicators. a, b, 
and c refer to the sign test on comparison of medians between ‘acquisition’ and ‘divestiture,’ ‘divestiture’ and ‘government,’ and ‘acquisition’ and ‘government,’ 
respectively. 
 
 According to the results of the tests, distressed banks involved in the three types of 
restructuring deals are typically less profitable and display lower asset quality than their 
peers, as expected. In general, distressed targets and sellers have significantly unfavorable 
median-adjusted indicators. Distressed sellers are much larger than those banks in the other 
two categories and are the worst in terms of all indicators except for efficiency, where they 
are not significantly different from targets of distressed acquisitions. Distressed targets are in 
the middle, though their performance is not good using median-adjusted ratios as they 
underperform their peers in terms of asset quality and profitability, but their liquidity levels 
are better. Distressed banks in which the government intervened enjoy better asset quality, 
capital adequacy, efficiency, and profitability when compared to banks involved in the other 
deals. The problem of government-intervened banks lies in their poor liquidity, which 
emphasizes the flow-based insolvency of these banks as opposed to stock-based insolvency 
(see Wruck, 1990). Thus, these banks are ‘fair performers’ with short-term cash-flow issues. 
The fact that these banks are not relatively larger does not support the argument that they are 
‘too big to fail.’ 
 
Effectiveness of the Different Distress Resolution Methods 
In order to identify the most efficient distress resolution methods, it is necessary to examine 
the changes in the financial characteristics of the distressed banks that adopt these different 
techniques. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. 
 Table 4: Bank Performance Post-Restructuring 
Ratios Acquisitions Testa Divestitures Testb Government Testc Total 
Size 20   25   14   59  
Median 13,627.40  *** 67,703.70   15,437.90   24,913.00  
Year -1 to Year +3 UP ***  UP **  UP ***  UP *** 
Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue 20   25   12   57  
Median 17.93   16.95   11.52   16.01  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Industry-Median Adjusted 16.58 ***  15.61 ***  10.13 **  15.61 *** 
Year -1 to Year +3            
Total Equity to Total Assets 20   25   13   58  
Median 8.15   7.87  *** 12.60  *** 8.68  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP ***     UP *** 
Industry-Median Adjusted -1.17 ***  -1.77  *** 11.13 *** *** -0.58  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP ***       
Cost to Income Ratio 20   25   14   59  
Median 66.45   62.70  *** 1.68  *** 60.87  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Industry-Median Adjusted 1.42   -3.43  *** -63.19  *** -1.67  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Return on Average Assets 20   25   14   59  
Median 0.98   0.92  *** 12.60  *** 1.05  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP **     UP *** 
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.10   -0.02  *** 12.16 *** *** 0.21  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP *     UP ** 
Net Interest Margin 20   25   14   59  
Median 3.18  ** 2.42   3.00   2.73  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.49  ** -1.18 *** *** 0.46   -0.62 *** 
Year -1 to Year +3            
Interbank Ratio 15   20   14   49  
Median 99.18   110.79  *** 58.12  *** 75.58  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP ***     UP *** 
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.42   17.08  * -22.99   5.10  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Net Loans to Total Assets 20   24   14   58  
Median 57.22   61.33  *** 75.28  ** 60.54  
Year -1 to Year +3       UP *  UP ** 
Industry-Median Adjusted -3.78 **  -3.06  *** 29.76 * *** -0.68  
Year -1 to Year +3            
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, and refer to the sign test on the significance of Industry Median-adjusted indicators. a, b, 
and c refer to the sign test on comparison of medians between ‘acquisition’ and ‘divestiture,’ ‘divestiture’ and ‘government,’ and ‘acquisition’ and ‘government,’ 
respectively.
 For the restructuring deals, all banks have significantly increased in size over the four-year 
span. The banks with government intervention are still the best performers but there are now 
no significant changes between distressed targets and distressed sellers except for 
profitability, with evidence of distressed targets enjoying a larger net interest margin. The 
winners are the distressed sellers, showing significant improvements in capital adequacy, 
profitability, and liquidity. While the performance indicators for distressed targets have not 
significantly changed, there is evidence of liquidity deterioration for those banks in which the 
government intervened. 
These findings should however be interpreted with caution since the sample size is not 
very large and the focus is on the performance one year prior to the M&A deal or divestiture 
announcement to three years afterwards. As noted earlier, some of the effects associated with 
the implemented distress resolution strategies may take longer to manifest.  
 
Cross-Border Deals 
Table 5 provides a comparison of the financial characteristics of cross-border and domestic 
deals in the different types of restructuring methods one year prior to the announcement of 
M&A deal or divestiture. As before, the aim is to identify motivational differences regarding 
the resolution strategy that the distressed banks adopt or to which they become subject.  
 Table 5: Bank Performance Pre-Restructuring – Cross-Border vs. Domestic Deals 
 Acquisitions Divestitures Total 
Ratios Cross-Border Testa Domestic Cross-Border Testb Domestic Cross-Border Testc Domestic 
Size 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 13,184.00  *** 1,491.95  41,036.10   77,678.80  24,691.00   10,525.00  
Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 27.10   30.19  37.01   29.37  31.18   29.37  
Industry-Median Adjusted 25.74 ***  28.82 ** 35.60 ***  27.99 *** 29.81 ***  27.99 *** 
Total Equity to Total Assets 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 7.08   7.64  5.48   5.26  6.35   7.14  
Industry-Median Adjusted -1.08   -1.00  -2.91 **  -2.54  -2.56 **  -1.49  
Cost to Income Ratio 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 63.81  ** 87.79  66.28   70.72  65.98  ** 71.38  
Industry-Median Adjusted -3.34  ** 22.60  2.27   5.37  0.36  ** 6.21  
Return on Average Assets 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 0.59  ** 0.10  0.21   0.22  0.53   0.20  
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.16  * -0.66 ** -0.38 ***  -0.62  -0.30 ***  -0.62 *** 
Net Interest Margin 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 3.42   3.31  2.37   2.33  3.03   2.96  
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.10   -0.41  -1.24 ***  -1.39  -0.64 **  -0.72 * 
Interbank Ratio 12   3  11   9  23   12  
Median 64.46   192.96  70.34   70.34  69.80   70.34  
Industry-Median Adjusted -11.07   112.80  -19.84 **  -19.84  -16.04 *  -19.84  
Net Loans to Total Assets 14   6  13   11  27   17  
Median 52.40  *** 60.10  57.92   60.28  56.65  * 60.28  
Industry-Median Adjusted -9.22 *** *** -0.06  -0.07   -0.07  -3.82 *** * -0.07  
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, and refer to the sign test on the significance of Industry Median-adjusted indicators. a, b, 
and c, refer to the sign test on comparison of medians between ‘cross-border’ and ‘domestic’ for ‘acquisition,’ ‘divestiture,’ and ‘total,’ respectively. 
 According to the results of the tests, distressed banks involved in cross-border deals are 
typically more liquid and efficient than those engaged in domestic deals. Distressed sellers in 
cross-border deals are underperformers compared to their peers except for the efficiency 
ratio, where there is no significant difference. Still, there are no significant differences 
between distressed sellers involved in domestic and cross-border deals. The situation is, 
however, the reverse when it comes to acquisitions as foreign acquirers seem to ‘cherry pick’ 
the relatively largest and least distressed banks; that is, these targets are more profitable, 
efficient, and liquid compared to distressed targets in domestic deals. This evidence thus 
supports Tschoegl’s (2004) argument that foreign banks are more likely to take over banks in 
relatively better shape yet still they underperform their peers, in line with Correa (2008) and 
Fraser and Zhang (2009). 
Regarding the analysis of the changes in the financial characteristics of the distressed 
banks following the restructuring, Table 6 presents the results classified by type of deal. 
 Table 6: Bank Performance Post-Restructuring – Cross-Border vs. Domestic Deals 
 Acquisitions Divestitures Total 
Ratios Cross-Border Testa Domestic Cross-Border Testb Domestic Cross-Border Testc Domestic 
Size 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 20,179.30  *** 1,399.50  67,703.70   52,665.40  39,061.20  * 14,717.50  
Year -1 to Year +3 UP **    UP *    UP ***    
Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 16.65   21.99  16.95   15.47  16.95   20.22  
Year -1 to Year +3                
Industry-Median Adjusted 15.27 **  20.67  15.61 **  14.14 ** 15.61 ***  18.96 *** 
Year -1 to Year +3                
Total Equity to Total Assets 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 8.15   8.33  7.28   8.67  7.87  * 8.57  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP ** UP **  UP ***    UP *** 
Industry-Median Adjusted -1.17 **  -1.15  -2.06 *  -0.62  -1.77 *** * -0.87  
Year -1 to Year +3      UP **       UP * 
Cost to Income Ratio 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 66.34   66.87  65.89   60.87  65.89   61.79  
Year -1 to Year +3              DOWN * 
Industry-Median Adjusted 1.42   1.71  -0.67   -3.43  0.62   -3.00  
Year -1 to Year +3              DOWN * 
Return on Average Assets 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 1.03   0.60  0.92   0.92  0.94   0.90  
Year -1 to Year +3    UP ** UP *       UP ** 
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.12   -0.30  -0.02   0.01  0.05   -0.02  
Year -1 to Year +3      UP *         
Net Interest Margin 14   6  13   12  27   18  
Median 3.18   2.85  2.32   2.58  2.73   2.59  
Year -1 to Year +3      DOWN *         
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.49   -0.76  -1.21 **  -1.05 ** -0.97 **  -1.04 ** 
Year -1 to Year +3                
Interbank Ratio 12   3  11   9  23   12  
Median 94.61   229.73  120.74   96.15  100.84   108.45  
Year -1 to Year +3      UP *         
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.14   143.97  38.62   5.98  5.10   17.08  
Year -1 to Year +3                
Net Loans to Total Assets 14   6  13   11  27   17  
Median 54.56   61.43  61.39   61.27  56.97   61.27  
Year -1 to Year +3                
Industry-Median Adjusted -7.96 *  -0.68  -4.58   0.92  -7.06 **  -0.51  
Year -1 to Year +3                
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, and refer to the sign test on the significance of Industry Median-adjusted indicators. a, b, 
and c, refer to the sign test on comparison of medians between ‘cross-border’ and ‘domestic’ for ‘acquisition,’ ‘divestiture,’ and ‘total,’ respectively. 
 Following the restructuring deals, banks in all cross-border deals have significantly increased 
in size over the four-year span while those in domestic deals have improved their efficiency. 
Three years after the deals, the performance of the distressed banks is very different. If before 
the deals, distressed targets in cross-border deals were in better shape than those in domestic 
deals, three years later there are no significant differences in performance, mainly as a result 
of significant improvements in capital adequacy and profitability in the latter banks. 
Conversely, the distressed sellers involved in cross-border deals enjoy significant 
improvements in profitability, liquidity, and capital adequacy, with distressed sellers in 
domestic deals also displaying increases in the latter indicator. 
The results support Correa (2008) and Vander and Vennet (2002) as they confirm that 
targets involved in cross-border acquisitions are larger than those in domestic deals and fail to 
enjoy improvements in performance post-deal. However, the results do not support Correa’s 
(2008) finding that targets in cross-border deals are poor performers compared to those 
acquired in domestic deals. Nor do they support Fraser and Zhang’s (2009) observation of 
improvements in profitability and efficiency post-deal. 
 
Evidence from Recent Bank Failures 
In order to see whether the results of the study can be extended to recent bank failures, the 
financial characteristics of a global sample of 129 distressed targets and sellers were analyzed 
one year prior to the announcement of an acquisition, divestiture or government intervention 
during the period 2007 – 2009. Overall, the motivation behind the different distress resolution 
strategies appears to have been similar during the recent financial crisis to the 1994 – 2005 
main sample, as outlined in Table 7. 
 
 Table 7: Bank Performance Pre-Restructuring (Recent Financial Crisis) 
Ratios Acquisitions Testa Divestitures Testb Government Testc Total 
Size 30   67   32   129  
Median 10,129.40  ** 60,909.50  *** 1,535.21  *** 6,709.10  
Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue 30   67   32   129  
Median 16.07  *** 50.01  *** 8.07  *** 23.89  
Industry-Median Adjusted 5.63 *** *** 40.48 ***  31.80 *** ** 19.38 *** 
Total Equity to Total Assets 30   67   32   129  
Median 6.69   6.02  *** 9.16  ** 7.07  
Industry-Median Adjusted -2.89 **  -3.63 *** *** -0.48  ** -2.55 *** 
Cost to Income Ratio 28   67   32   127  
Median 63.89  *** 72.28  * 68.28   70.91  
Industry-Median Adjusted -3.34  *** 3.79 ** * 1.89   2.29 ** 
Return on Average Assets 30   67   32   129  
Median 0.61  *** -0.41  *** 0.72   0.34  
Industry-Median Adjusted -0.18  *** -1.05 *** *** -0.15   -0.42 *** 
Net Interest Margin 30   67   32   129  
Median 3.50  ** 2.92  *** 3.84   3.02  
Industry-Median Adjusted 0.04  ** -0.73 *** *** 0.38 **  -0.52 *** 
Interbank Ratio 17   28   3   48  
Median 40.17  * 87.67   143.15   68.71  
Industry-Median Adjusted -58.64   -9.61   47.40   -29.50  
Net Loans to Total Assets 30   67   32   129  
Median 56.45   62.12  *** 77.55  *** 66.76  
Industry-Median Adjusted -7.55   -4.57  *** 12.12 *** *** 0.97  
Notes: ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, and refer to the sign test on the significance of Industry Median-adjusted indicators. a, b, 
and c refer to the sign test on comparison of medians between ‘acquisition’ and ‘divestiture,’ ‘divestiture’ and ‘government,’ and ‘acquisition’ and ‘government,’ 
respectively. 
 As before, distressed banks involved in the three types of restructuring deals are less 
profitable and display lower asset quality than their peers. In addition, their capital adequacy 
and efficiency ratios are worse. Distressed targets are still the worst performers prior to the 
restructuring deals, while banks which have had government intervention suffer from the 
same liquidity issues as in the main sample (this time proxied by another liquidity ratio). 
Surprisingly, the evidence points towards governments intervening in the smallest banks 
during the recent financial crisis, despite the massive bailouts. 
It is too early to provide empirical evidence on post-performance following these 
different restructuring strategies during the recent financial crisis as the methodology used in 
this research requires three years of data post-deal. However, the fact that the findings with 
regard to motivation are confirmed by this more recent group of distressed banks suggests 
that the post-performance results presented in this study may be extended to the recent crisis 
and used as a reliable predictor of future post-performance outcomes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to assess the efficiency and financial 
consequences of existing methods to deal with distress and to identify the most effective 
distress resolution technique(s). Governments around the world have struggled with the 
decision of whether to rescue failing financial institutions or to allow (or encourage) private 
sector solutions. The existing literature includes no studies that analyze the motivation behind 
the different distress resolution techniques that have been adopted in the past or how the 
financial characteristics of the banks that participate in distressed M&A deals change over 
time. The chapter’s objective is to eliminate this deficiency in the existing literature.  
The findings of this study show that distressed banks that choose to divest divisions are 
the worst performers one year prior to the deal but the most improved three years later. 
Distressed banks which have government intervention are the best performers over the four-
year span, though their persistent major challenge is liquidity. Distressed targets are in 
between those two groups. 
Prior to the deal, while there are no significant differences in performance between 
distressed sellers involved in domestic and cross-border deals, there is evidence that foreign 
acquirers seem to ‘cherry pick’ the least distressed banks. Interestingly, three years later 
 distressed targets involved in domestic deals have managed to catch up with improvements in 
capital adequacy and profitability, and, as such, no significant differences remain in 
performance between distressed targets in cross-border and domestic deals. Conversely, the 
distressed sellers involved in cross-border deals seem to enjoy an improved performance 
compared to those involved in domestic deals. 
The findings presented in this study should be viewed with caution since they are based 
on the analysis of the direct financial costs associated with different distress resolution 
techniques. As a result, the effectiveness of distressed M&A is evaluated from the 
perspective of the investors of the financial institutions that participate in these types of deals. 
Further research and analysis is necessary in order to determine the strategy that could 
resolve financial distress most effectively and efficiently for all stakeholders directly or 
indirectly affected by it. Also, although the study has examined more recent deals in terms of 
motivation, in a few years it would be useful to apply this chapter’s post-deal performance 
methodology to these deals to determine if the findings and conclusions do still apply. 
There are interesting policy implications for governments and regulators globally. The 
results from this study provide guidance to governments and regulators throughout the world 
which may be faced with decisions in a future banking crisis. There is clear evidence from 
this work that distressed banks with government intervention were the best performers over 
the period studied, despite the challenges with the long-term liquidity issues in those banks 
noted above, although the private sector does have better capacity to implement effective 
distress resolution strategies relative to the public sector in cases of very poor performers 
(perhaps implying that in these extreme cases, government policy should encourage a private 
sector solution). This study therefore does provide support for regulations and policies that 
allow, if not even encourage, bank mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures as a mechanism to 
resolve distress involving both domestic and foreign banks. 
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